Since 1945, the global leadership of the United States has been instrumental in upholding international law and safeguarding the democratic order.1 American dominance has effectively deterred the rise of both global and regional hegemons. The principles outlined in the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance, which emphasized Washington’s commitment to preventing emerging threats and protecting the global order, remain pertinent even three decades later. The Biden administration, aligning with the 2017 National Security Strategy, is prioritizing its military strategy, weapons development, and defense procurement towards the Indo-Pacific region, underscoring this area as the central focus of the U.S. military in the 21st century.
The foundation of U.S. military power rests upon a deterrence policy encompassing both punishment and denial. According to political scientist John Mearsheimer, punishment involves the threat of devastating an adversary’s infrastructure, while denial aims to dissuade an opponent by demonstrating the futility of achieving their military objectives.2 Deterrence by punishment leverages an adversary’s fear of massive retaliation, whereas deterrence by denial emphasizes the invincibility of an opponent’s goals through advanced integrated weapon systems, joint operational capabilities, and precision offensive firepower. This strategy effectively shifts higher risks and costs onto potential adversaries like China, while mitigating risks for the United States. As noted by Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, U.S. engagement has been a significant contributor to stability across critical strategic theaters.3
The United States possesses significant advantages when its military power is compared to the world, especially against China. The U.S. surpasses China in key metrics including gross domestic product (GDP), technological advancement, and military expenditure. While China’s GDP constitutes 15 percent of the global GDP, the United States accounts for a substantial 24 percent.4 The U.S. maintains a technological lead in crucial domains such as command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), as well as in air, surface, and undersea weapon systems. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has invested an estimated $19 trillion in its military. This figure dwarfs China’s military spending by $16 trillion and nearly equals the combined military expenditure of the rest of the world during the same period.5
The U.S. military boasts extensive combat experience, having engaged in both conventional and unconventional warfare across numerous continents. The United States has accumulated war-fighting experience from World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, Panama, Grenada, the First Gulf War, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Its military is capable of rapid deployment to virtually any location on the globe. The United States also maintains strategic peace through a network of military bases and defense alliances spanning Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.6 In the post-Cold War era, the U.S. achieved military dominance through the AirLand Battle doctrine. Currently, the U.S. is reorienting its military assets towards the Indo-Pacific, preparing for a potential SeaAir Battle concept.
The U.S. Navy (USN) has established unparalleled maritime supremacy. It operates 11 carrier strike groups, projecting power across the oceans. The Indo-Pacific region is familiar territory for the United States, with a history of military engagements during World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. INDOPACOM receives a significant allocation of U.S. military resources, including 60 percent of the USN, 55 percent of the U.S. Army, and 40 percent of the U.S. Marine Corps.7
During the First Gulf War, the United States effectively decimated what was then the fourth-largest military in the world – Iraq’s army. Airpower played a decisive role, with minimal ground engagements between U.S. and Iraqi forces. This conflict served as a crucial study for China in understanding modern warfare. In a hypothetical full-scale war scenario, China would likely face similar devastation against the nuclear and conventionally superior U.S. military. China lacks recent experience in managing external crises or engaging in large-scale modern wars. A significant technological gap persists between the United States and China, placing them in different leagues of military capability.
An Overwhelming US Military Superiority
Navy
The U.S. Navy’s integration of advanced weapon systems and C4ISR capabilities with multi-domain networking and sophisticated ship defenses renders it significantly more formidable than the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), irrespective of the PLAN’s numerical advantages in submarines and warships. The PLAN comprises 63 warships exceeding 3,000 tons, with a total tonnage of 447,000 tons. In stark contrast, the USN operates 120 warships with a massive total tonnage of 2 million tons.8 PLAN warships are equipped with approximately 1,900 missiles, while the USN’s warships deploy a staggering 9,500 missiles.9
Origami boats symbolizing a confrontation between the United States and China
The outcome of contemporary warfare is primarily determined by C4ISR capabilities rather than sheer quantities of weapon systems. The United States possesses a substantial lead in its ability to track and prioritize PLAN targets. The USN is equipped with 426 C4ISR aircraft, whereas the PLAN possesses a mere 22 such aircraft. The PLAN operates 441 fixed-wing aircraft and 118 helicopters, while the USN10 and the Marine Corps11 collectively command 2,448 fixed-wing aircraft and 1,249 helicopters. The PLAN’s two aircraft carriers (ACs) have a limited capacity of 70 aircraft, while the USN’s 11 ACs can collectively deploy over 800 aircraft. The Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group (CSG), featuring the USS Ronald Reagan, the USN’s only forward-deployed aircraft carrier, is currently operating alongside the Nimitz CSG 11 and Theodore Roosevelt CSG in the Pacific, conducting operations aimed at China.12
While the USN and PLAN maintain a comparable number of submarines, the USN’s technologically superior submarine fleet weighs 730,000 tons, tripling the tonnage of the PLAN’s submarine force.13 The Block V Virginia-class ballistic missile submarine program, with a contract for 11 submarines, is set to significantly enhance its Tomahawk cruise missile capacity to 40 missiles per submarine.14
The USN is integrating 10 advanced DDG 51 Flight III destroyers, incorporating cutting-edge technologies such as enhanced power capabilities for laser weapons, upgraded engines, improved electronics, and the sophisticated SPY-6 radar system. Currently, 20 DDG 51 class ships are under contract at U.S. shipyards.15 The United States is also developing the new Flight IIA DDG 51s, which will feature next-generation radar technology, the Aegis Baseline 9 Combat System, BMD capabilities, and anti-ship cruise missile capabilities. Both the Flight IIA and III variants are equipped with 96 missile tubes, compatible with SM-2, SM-6, and Tomahawk cruise missiles.
Logistics
The United States possesses a dedicated military airlift command and maintains extensive agreements with private logistics transport companies. The U.S. military operates 516 installations across 41 countries and maintains bases in over 80 countries globally.16 Annually, the United States allocates $156 billion to support its 800 overseas bases, while China’s total annual defense budget is approximately US$180 billion.17 U.S. military bases are strategically located in regions such as Italy, Diego Garcia, South Korea, Australia, Japan, Kuwait, and Qatar, collectively storing an estimated million pieces of weapon systems. U.S. military personnel are stationed in 160 countries, with active ground troops deployed in more than 15 nations.18 The USN operates 31 fast combat supply ships with a combined tonnage of 1.29 million tons, significantly outmatching the PLAN, which has only 12 supply ships totaling 330,000 tons.19
Nuclear
China’s nuclear arsenal is estimated at around 200 warheads, with projections indicating a doubling of this capacity within the next decade.20 In comparison, the United States possesses nearly 4,000 superior nuclear warheads, including 1,600 strategic weapons. The United States continues to modernize its nuclear capabilities, maintaining a force far exceeding the minimum requirements for effective nuclear retaliation against China.21
USAF
The U.S. Air Force (USAF) has strategically deployed advanced aircraft, including F-15, F-16, and F-22 fighter jets; B-1 and B-2 bombers; and aerial refueling tankers at Guam.22 The USAF’s Rapid Raptor program enables the swift global deployment of F-22s to any location worldwide within 24 hours.23 The USAF operates 44 missile interceptors housed in hardened silos in Alaska and California. Furthermore, the United States is developing the next-generation stealth B-21 bomber, slated for its maiden flight in 2022. The B-21 will be equipped with advanced weaponry, including next-generation long-range standoff stealth nuclear cruise missiles and JASSM-ER conventional cruise missiles.
Global Partners
The United States benefits from an extensive network of international partnerships that enhance security, promote global stability, and prevent conflicts. In the Indo-Pacific region, the U.S. forward military presence and robust cooperation with regional partners serve as a significant deterrent to China.24
The United States leads the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and extends a defense umbrella to key allies like Japan and South Korea. The U.S. maintains a substantial troop presence with approximately 29,500 personnel stationed in South Korea and an additional 45,000 in Japan.25 The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) exercises unite Indo-Pacific democracies committed to upholding a rules-based international order against perceived threats from China. The United States also engages in bilateral military cooperation with nations including Australia, the Philippines, Thailand, India, Singapore, Indonesia, and Vietnam. The U.S. Third Fleet commander has highlighted the broad international support, noting that approximately 10 nations participate in U.S. military exercises, while China’s exercises typically involve fewer than two participating nations.26 An attack on the United States would likely trigger Article V of the NATO treaty, resulting in direct intervention from NATO member states, as was demonstrated during the 2001 Afghanistan War.
Why China Cannot Challenge the United States
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Major General Zhang Shaozhong assessed China’s military power in 2020, ranking it fifth globally, behind the United States, Russia, Britain, and France. He placed the PLAN’s surface power eighth, even trailing Japan and India. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) was ranked seventh worldwide, primarily due to deficiencies in fourth-generation fighter aircraft and advanced drones. General Shaozhong projected that China would only ascend to the position of the second-largest military power globally by 2049, coinciding with the centennial anniversary of the People’s Republic of China.27
The US Military as an Economic Deterrent
The U.S. military serves a critical function as an economic deterrent. The legitimacy of the Communist Party of China (CCP) is closely tied to sustained economic development. While China might contemplate targeting Guam with its limited fleet of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), such an action would likely provoke massive retaliatory strikes from the United States, leading to the catastrophic destruction of China’s military and key economic centers.28 The USN’s Maritime Strike Tomahawk Cruise Missile Block V possesses the capability to devastate coastal cities like Shanghai, effectively dismantling China’s high-tech industries within hours.
The CCP leadership lacks extensive experience in nuclear strategy, particularly in the nuances of nuclear warfare as practiced by the United States and Russia. China’s nuclear doctrine is characterized by a low-level deterrence posture, often termed “minimum deterrence,” and its nuclear arsenal remains relatively small and vulnerable.29 Threatening the United States with approximately 200 nuclear weapons is not a viable strategic option. While the United States and China are geographically comparable in size, China’s economy is considerably more susceptible to nuclear strikes. Its critical infrastructure and economic assets are heavily concentrated along the coastlines, unlike the more dispersed infrastructure of the United States.
A military conflict would result in the loss of China’s exports to the United States, valued at USD 310 billion. War would precipitate a sharp decline in industrial production, widespread unemployment, and escalating inflation, potentially triggering a severe economic crisis and social unrest. Conversely, historical precedents, such as World War II, indicate that the United States could experience economic gains from wartime conditions, characterized by increased employment and industrial growth.
Maintaining superpower status is a costly endeavor. As Sun Tzu noted in The Art of War over two millennia ago, “first count the cost.”30 China’s defense budget cannot effectively compete with the combined military spending of the United States, India, Japan, and Australia. The United States alone allocates more resources to national defense than the combined expenditures of China, India, Russia, Saudi Arabia, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, South Korea, and Brazil.31 The escalating costs of an arms race would place immense strain on China’s economic development goals by necessitating increased military spending.
The Absence of War-fighting Experience
The United States employs a sophisticated analytical learning process within its military, a capability that is less developed in China.32 The U.S. military meticulously documents lessons learned from conflicts, integrating them into doctrines, tactics, techniques, and procedures. This formalized approach to learning and adaptation dates back to events such as the Boxer Rebellion during the China campaign.33 Throughout its history, the U.S. military has benefited from the leadership of exceptional generals such as George Marshall, Dwight Eisenhower, George Patton, and David Petraeus. In contrast, China has historically lacked comparable figures in military leadership. Globally, military officers are more inclined to seek education and training at U.S. military institutions rather than their Chinese counterparts.
PLA strategy is significantly influenced by Mao’s theory of leveraging asymmetric approaches for weaker adversaries against stronger opponents, emphasizing deception and unconventional tactics. China’s reliance on asymmetric strategies stems from its limitations in engaging in symmetric warfare. Chinese military scholars have produced influential works such as Science of Military Campaigns, Science of Military Strategy, and Unrestricted Warfare.34 However, China faces challenges in translating the strategic and tactical concepts outlined in these texts into actionable and effective military doctrines.
The Lack of Power Projection
Power projection capabilities are a defining characteristic of a superpower. Despite China’s use of economic tools, from its Charm Offensive to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), to exert influence and encourage alignment from U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, these efforts have not yielded substantial success.35 China lacks true global reach due to the absence of extensive foreign defense treaties or a network of logistical bases stocked with military supplies abroad.36 In the event of a conflict with the United States, securing military support from even close allies like Pakistan would be challenging, given Pakistan’s historical military ties with the United States.
China’s operational capabilities are constrained by the unrefueled range of its aircraft, warships, and submarines. U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carriers can sustain operations at sea for up to four years before refueling is required. In contrast, China’s non-nuclear-powered aircraft carriers have limited operational ranges beyond coastal waters. The Type 903 replenishment ship can only support a small number of ships for approximately two weeks.37 The USN’s fleet of 68 nuclear-powered submarines routinely project naval power across the world’s oceans, a capability not matched by the PLAN’s nuclear-powered submarines.
Fighter aircraft operating without essential support such as air-refueling tankers, Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, or a network of expeditionary airfields are severely limited in their operational range. The PLAAF’s capacity to effectively target U.S. bases in the Pacific is hampered by insufficient air-refueling capabilities. Refueling a flight group of just eight J-11B Flanker fighters for a seven-hour mission would require two air-refueling tankers to perform simultaneous refuelings twice.38 This would necessitate deploying 20 percent of the PLAAF’s tanker fleet just for this limited operation. The PLAAF possesses only 10 tankers for over a thousand fighter aircraft, while the USAF operates 625 tankers for 1,956 fighter aircraft.39 Tanker aircraft, being highly vulnerable, would become prime targets for the USN, potentially jeopardizing the Flankers.
China’s primary bomber, the H-6K, is based on the outdated 1950s Soviet-designed Tu-16 bomber. Even when equipped with CJ-10 cruise missiles, the H-6K is incapable of reaching Hawaii. The H-6K has a combat range of 3,800 miles, while Hawaii is located 5,157 miles from the nearest H-6K base. Attempts by the H-6K to attack even closer U.S. bases would be easily detected by U.S. C4ISR systems over the open seas. Furthermore, PLAAF fighters lack the range to provide adequate escort for these bombers.40
An Archaic Military
In 2011, less than 30 percent of China’s surface forces, air force, and air defense forces, and 55 percent of its submarine fleet were considered modern.41 Despite subsequent modernization efforts, a significant portion of China’s military hardware remains outdated.42
The Chinese military faces institutional challenges stemming from antiquated command structures, personnel quality issues, and corruption.43 Weaknesses persist in critical support capabilities, including logistics, airlift capacity, and air defense and anti-submarine warfare capabilities.44
The PLA’s allegiance to the CCP has been cited as a factor potentially hindering its overall competence.45 China’s military training and operational capabilities still fall short of U.S. standards.46 PLAAF pilots, for instance, are often criticized for lacking proficiency in executing complex aerial maneuvers during unplanned operational scenarios.47
China’s military structure presents significant cultural obstacles,48 prioritizing control over command effectiveness.49 A pervasive culture of risk aversion and limited trust in subordinates impacts the PLA’s operational effectiveness.50 The highly centralized command structure impedes the PLAN’s ability to operate autonomously during wartime. This is evidenced by the placement of political commissars on PLAN warships and submarines.51 In contrast, the USN values autonomy at all levels, from individual sailors to institutions, reflecting its emphasis on effective command at sea.52 Nation-states cannot effectively project power globally with overly rigid command-and-control systems.53
PLAN submarines are reported to have the worst safety record globally.54 The PLAN’s rudimentary nuclear missile submarine fleet carries a limited number of missiles.55 The PLAN cannot effectively threaten the U.S. mainland, as its submarines must navigate through strategic chokepoints such as the Kuril and Ryukyu Islands, Luzon Strait, Taiwan Strait, and the Philippine archipelago—all of which are under U.S. naval control.56 These chokepoints form a crescent-shaped defensive line, integral to U.S. containment strategy, and are actively monitored by the United States. PLAN submarine capabilities are outdated compared to the USN’s overwhelming undersea warfare prowess. The U.S. submarine force provides strategic deterrence in the Indo-Pacific through a comprehensive suite of capabilities, including anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare, precision land strikes, intelligence gathering, surveillance, reconnaissance, and special warfare operations.
During the Cold War, Soviet weapon systems were highly sought after by U.S. intelligence to analyze their strengths and weaknesses. Numerous Soviet-made fighter aircraft were acquired through defections, such as an Iraqi MiG 21 that defected to Israel and a Soviet MiG 25 that landed in Japan. These aircraft were subsequently transferred to the United States for detailed technical analysis. However, U.S. intelligence agencies do not appear to be actively seeking defections of PLAAF fighter aircraft, indicating a lack of interest in acquiring outdated Chinese technology. Instead, China is often accused of engaging in the theft of weapon data or reverse-engineering U.S. weapon systems.57 Even CCP-controlled military media has described the Shenyang J-15 Flying Shark fighter aircraft as a “flopping fish,” criticizing its lack of stealth capabilities compared to the F-35 Lightning.58
The U.S. F-117 Nighthawk stealth fighter entered service in 1983 and saw combat in the First Gulf War, while fifth-generation fighters like the F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lightning have been deployed in active conflict zones. Conversely, the PLAAF has not yet operationally inducted the J-31 fighter, and the J-20 fighter has not demonstrated its capabilities in any significant bilateral or multilateral military exercises. The much-publicized Chengdu J-20 is a heavy fighter aircraft comparable to the MiG 31, primarily an interceptor rather than a versatile multirole or air superiority fighter.
China’s Vulnerable A2/AD Zones
Analysis of modern warfare suggests that the United States could effectively neutralize China’s military capabilities without even penetrating its Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) zones. This strategy mirrors the U.S. approach in the 1990 Gulf War, where Iraqi defenses were decimated from outside their immediate defense perimeters. The U.S.’s strategic depth in Asia allows military planners to concentrate forces at various geographically advantageous locations.
The United States possesses a formidable array of lethal weapon systems, particularly submarines, ideally suited for countering China’s A2/AD strategies. In the First Gulf War, the U.S. launched 297 Tomahawk missiles, which played a crucial role in dismantling the Iraqi military infrastructure.59 Ohio-class submarines can operate undetected within an adversary’s A2/AD zone, close to shore, enabling strikes against inland targets. A deployment of just four Ohio-class submarines, equipped with a total of 616 BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles, could potentially cripple China’s military capabilities. The relatively inexperienced PLAN aircraft carrier groups would be highly vulnerable to long-range anti-ship missiles (LRASM), Tomahawks, and Mark 48-Mod 7 torpedoes launched from USS Key West, USS Oklahoma City, USS Topeka, and USS Asheville submarines based in Guam.
The USN and USAF have secured a USD 414 million contract for the development of autonomously guided anti-ship LRASMs equipped with onboard sensors, jam-resistant technology, and stealth capabilities making them difficult to detect.60 The stealth-capable Zumwalt-class warship, incorporating advanced technologies, can operate undetected in littoral waters and contested zones, providing a platform for launching LRASM and Tomahawk cruise missiles.
China’s construction of military bases on islands in the South China Sea, while expanding its military footprint, creates infrastructure highly vulnerable to U.S. weapon systems. These artificial islands lack natural defenses and camouflage.61 In a conflict scenario, these bases would be easily neutralized by the USN, as the PLA cannot effectively conceal assets behind natural terrain. Once these facilities are destroyed, resupply from the mainland would be severely hampered by U.S. naval dominance. While China’s military modernization efforts enhance its A2/AD capabilities, they do not translate into a robust blue-water, sea-control capability.62
China’s Hyped DF-21 Missile
The anti-ship DF-21 missile, transported on massive transporter erector launchers, boasts a range of 1,400 miles. However, the missile regiments are based in the Gobi Desert, making them easily identifiable and targetable by the U.S. military. While the DF-21 has been tested against stationary ships, it has not been successfully tested against moving targets under realistic conditions.63 Engaging a moving aircraft carrier requires a complex “system of systems”64 to accurately track the target, determine its precise location, maintain missile lock, penetrate the carrier’s layered defenses, and provide mid-course updates, especially considering a ship can move up to 30 miles within an hour. The actual effectiveness of the DF-21 against U.S. Carrier Strike Group countermeasures remains unproven.65
Neither the United States nor Russia has yet developed a missile system directly comparable to the DF-21. However, China lacks the sophisticated C4ISR systems necessary to effectively strike targets at such extended ranges. China’s lack of transparency regarding missile testing data raises significant questions about its operational capabilities, particularly its ability to hit moving targets with precision guidance technologies.66 Until verifiable evidence is presented, the operational effectiveness of the DF-21 remains largely speculative and based on circumstantial inferences.
Opium War: Then and Now—Nothing Much Has Changed
Historical parallels can be drawn between the Qing military’s unpreparedness during the Opium Wars and the contemporary PLA’s potential underestimation of U.S. military power.67 The Opium Wars were fought between the antiquated Qing military and an industrialized, technologically advanced Britain, possessing the world’s most powerful navy.68 British forces comprised approximately 20,000 troops and three dozen modern Royal Navy warships. In contrast, China maintained a large military force of 800,000, but only about 35 percent were equipped with firearms.69 China possessed several A2/AD advantages, including strategic depth, numerical superiority, familiarity with the terrain, and robust coastal defenses.70 However, similar to today’s PLA, Qing troops lacked significant combat experience, while British troops were battle-hardened and highly disciplined from extensive campaigns in the Middle East and Asia.71 The Qing’s archaic military system struggled to deploy troops effectively against the mobile British forces.72 Incompetent Chinese generals, such as Yi Shan and Yang Fang, led to critical defeats, such as in the pivotal Battle of Canton in 1841.73
The Opium Wars provide military parallels relevant to the PLA today. These wars resulted in the collapse of the Qing dynasty and the decimation of China’s military. The outcome of a contemporary war with the United States could bear striking resemblances to the political consequences of the Opium Wars. The Treaty of Tianjin in 1858, imposed by foreign powers, severely weakened China. Russia, while not directly involved militarily, capitalized on China’s vulnerability to pressure China into ceding large territories, including Vladivostok.74 The repercussions of the Opium Wars contributed to the Boxer Rebellion in 1899. Decades later, the Japanese invasion of 1937 further highlighted China’s vulnerability to external naval powers.
Conclusion
The U.S. military exhibits dominance across the strategic, tactical, and operational levels of warfare. The Pentagon is actively developing advanced network warfare programs such as the Advanced Battle Management System, Project Convergence, and Joint All Domain Command and Control, aimed at maintaining and enhancing this advantage. China is acutely aware of the lethal and distributed nature of the U.S. military, which combines both qualitative and quantitative superiority in weapon systems. The USN surpasses the PLAN in rapid deployment capabilities, maneuverability, and expeditionary warfare. The consistent and overwhelming display of U.S. military power since 1945 serves as a credible deterrent for Beijing. Since the First Gulf War, the United States has demonstrated its capability to neutralize adversaries through preemptive strikes using long-range weapon systems like cruise missiles in the initial stages of conflict, minimizing the adversary’s opportunity to retaliate.75
According to Taylor Fravel, China does not yet qualify as a military superpower.76 There is limited evidence suggesting China’s strategic ambitions include developing global military capabilities on par with the United States. China’s current military strength is modest compared to the United States’ former adversary, the Soviet Union. China’s military resources would be significantly stretched in defending its vast territory, the third-largest country in the world. High-ranking officials within the CCP and PLA acknowledge the United States’ military advantages. Chinese scholars like Xu Ruike and Sun Degang recognize China as an economic powerhouse but concede that it remains a military lightweight, a status likely to persist for decades.77 U.S. primacy in the post-Cold War world has been a crucial factor in preventing a potential World War III. The two most significant potential expansionist powers, North Korea and China, have largely confined their military activities within their own borders. The United States maintains unrivaled military power, and China is not currently positioned to effectively challenge this dominance.
Mangesh Sawant
Mr. Sawant holds a master’s degree in international affairs from Columbia University, specializing in international security policy. He is an expert in military studies, defense, global security, and geopolitical risk analysis. Mangesh has over 18 years of experience in military strategy and tactics, warfare analysis, weapon systems assessment, research, policy analysis, and case study development. His articles have been featured in The National Interest, Small Wars Journal, Modern Diplomacy, Eurasia Review, E-International Relations, Indian Defense Review, Security Management, Geopolitical Monitor, Internationale Politik, and the Over the Horizon Journal.
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