Submarine capabilities stand as an undisputed area of U.S. dominance in naval power. To put it in perspective, while geographic size differs vastly – with South Korea being significantly smaller than the United States – the disparity in underwater military assets is equally immense. The United States Navy currently operates 66 nuclear submarines, a stark contrast to China’s 12. Large nuclear submarines possess significantly greater capabilities than their diesel-electric counterparts, boasting superior range, stealth, and offensive power.
U.S. submarines are also equipped with a combined total of 1,168 Vertical Launch System (VLS) cells. In comparison, People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarines currently lack confirmed VLS cells, although numerous experts project that China will integrate submarines with VLS cells in the near future to enhance their offensive capabilities.
Despite advancements in Chinese submarine technology, it is unlikely that China’s subsurface fleet will quickly rival that of the United States. This isn’t necessarily due to a lasting technological or production advantage held by the U.S., but rather the substantial head start the United States established in submarine production decades ago. While China’s submarine technology is indeed rapidly advancing and its submarine production capacity is expanding, the gap remains considerable. A 2023 Department of Defense report anticipates China increasing its submarine force to 80 units by 2035 while decommissioning older systems. This represents a remarkable level of production, even if the majority are not nuclear-powered.
Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) is also receiving significant attention from the PLAN, which is actively refining its ASW doctrine and assets. However, the progress in ASW capabilities appears to be lagging behind the rapid advancements seen in their surface warfare capabilities.
Maintaining its dominance in subsurface warfare is of paramount importance for the United States. Open-source wargaming scenarios and strategic analyses suggest that U.S. submarines could play a decisive role in any potential conflict with China. However, the two submarine shipyards in the United States are currently facing strain in meeting production demands, struggling to even produce the two Virginia-class submarines per year needed to maintain, and ideally expand, the current size of the subsurface fleet. Efforts to ramp up construction capacity to counter China’s advancements in submarine construction and anti-submarine warfare are encountering significant headwinds. These challenges include escalating material costs and a shortage of skilled workers in the shipbuilding industry. Reflecting this urgency, the U.S. Navy’s Fiscal Year 2025 Unfunded Priorities List highlights the critical need for investment in the submarine industrial base, with the top priority being $403 million allocated to this sector, and several subsequent priorities also related to submarines and ASW capabilities.
Time is of the Essence
It’s crucial to understand that these trends do not automatically imply that the PLAN will inevitably defeat the U.S. Navy in a future conflict. Warfare is inherently complex and unpredictable. The U.S. Navy possesses significantly more combat experience and operational time at sea compared to the PLAN. Furthermore, the United States boasts a long-standing blue-water naval tradition spanning over two centuries, while China’s modern blue-water navy is a relatively recent development, emerging in the last three decades. Any potential conflict between China and the United States would also extend beyond naval engagements, encompassing joint operations across air, land, space, and cyber domains. The relative strengths of each nation in these diverse domains, along with strategic decision-making, leadership effectiveness, and unforeseen factors, will all play crucial roles in determining the outcome.
Moreover, China’s ascent to becoming the world’s preeminent naval power, or even the dominant naval power in the Pacific, is not guaranteed. Drawing definitive long-term conclusions based on current trends and open-source information, particularly regarding an organization as secretive as the PLAN, is inherently uncertain. The United States also benefits from considerable advantages beyond naval hardware. These include robust alliances, significant economic strength, and substantial soft power influence, factors that are not accounted for in a purely hardware-focused analysis.
However, the prevailing trends present a concerning trajectory for the United States. The U.S. Navy is confronting an increasing risk of potential defeat at sea, a situation not faced in half a century. The United States may soon encounter its first genuine challenger for maritime dominance since the collapse of the Soviet Union. China’s growing naval power is already enabling Beijing to project influence in the Pacific in ways that pose risks to U.S. allies and destabilize regional security. Unless the United States effectively addresses its relative decline in naval power, the world could be heading towards a more perilous and unpredictable future.
Alexander Palmer is an associate fellow in the Transnational Threats Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Henry H. Carroll is a research assistant with the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at CSIS. Nicholas Velazquez is a former research assistant with the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at CSIS.
Special thanks to Lauren Bailey in the CSIS iDeas Lab for visualization support and to Kelsey Hartman for editing and publication support.
