North Korean leader Kim Jong-un proudly showcased what he termed his “most powerful nuclear weapon” – a massive 60-ton missile – at Pyongyang’s Victory Day parade on July 28th. This missile, the pinnacle of North Korea’s military technology, is purportedly capable of delivering nuclear warheads across an estimated 15,000 kilometers, potentially reaching any location within the United States. This display of force comes after a year of unprecedented ballistic missile testing by North Korea, raising concerns about escalating tensions and the effectiveness of international efforts to curb Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions.
Despite these advancements and displays of military strength, it’s crucial to understand the actual scale of North Korea’s capabilities when juxtaposed against the United States. While North Korea has been aggressively developing its nuclear program, its arsenal remains quantitatively and qualitatively dwarfed by that of the United States. North Korea possesses an estimated few dozen nuclear weapons, a stark contrast to the thousands in the US arsenal. This vast disparity in nuclear capabilities begs the question: why hasn’t the United States been able to effectively deter North Korea’s continued weapons testing and development?
The answer isn’t straightforward and involves a complex interplay of factors. Firstly, the economic leverage the United States can exert over North Korea is limited. Secondly, paradoxically, the overwhelming nuclear superiority of the US might inadvertently reinforce Kim Jong-un’s conviction that nuclear weapons are indispensable for regime survival. In essence, North Korea’s unwavering resolve, born from a sense of vulnerability, becomes a potent tool in resisting pressure from significantly more powerful adversaries.
The Geopolitical Chessboard: North Korea’s Allies and Isolation
The Victory Day parade, commemorating the 70th anniversary of the Korean War armistice, was notable for the presence of Russian and Chinese officials – the first such high-level visits since the COVID-19 pandemic. This symbolic gesture highlighted the strengthening ties between North Korea and its key allies, Russia and China. During the Korean War, North Korea fought alongside Soviet and Chinese forces against South Korea and the United Nations Command, spearheaded by the United States.
North Korea exists largely in isolation on the global stage, heavily sanctioned due to its nuclear weapons program, which severely restricts its international trade. China stands as North Korea’s primary trading partner, and Pyongyang is significantly reliant on Beijing for both trade and economic assistance.
While trade volume with Russia is smaller, North Korea imports considerable quantities of essential goods like food and oil from its northern neighbor. Furthermore, recent developments indicate a warming relationship, with reports suggesting North Korea has been supplying arms and artillery to Russia in support of its war in Ukraine. The resumption of train travel along the Trans-Siberian Railway between the two nations after a hiatus of several years further underscores this growing cooperation.
Conversely, the United States finds itself with limited economic influence over North Korea. Stringent sanctions have effectively severed economic ties, forcing North Korea to adapt to self-reliance and minimize dependence on the US and its allies. While the US has occasionally provided humanitarian aid, the major sources of food assistance for North Korea are South Korea and China. Interestingly, North Korea has shown a remarkable resilience to external pressure, even rejecting foreign aid, including vaccines, during the COVID-19 pandemic. Over time, aid from countries other than South Korea and China has generally decreased.
The Shifting Sands of International Condemnation
In recent times, Russia and China have provided a degree of shelter for North Korea’s increasingly provocative actions. However, it’s important to note that both nations have historically been part of the international consensus against North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Numerous UN Security Council resolutions – nine in total, each approved by both Moscow and Beijing – have condemned North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests, urging Pyongyang to cease these activities. Despite these resolutions, lasting progress has been minimal. The last UN resolutions concerning North Korea’s nuclear program were passed in 2017, and there is little momentum for further UN action. Russia and China have resisted calls for new resolutions despite repeated appeals to address North Korea’s recent surge in missile testing.
Previously, both Russia and China actively participated in the “Six-Party Talks,” a diplomatic initiative aimed at dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program. However, these talks have been stalled since 2008, with North Korea declaring its withdrawal in 2009. While China called for their resumption in 2017, the prospect of their revival remains dim, at least in the near future.
Despite Russia and China’s reluctance to condemn North Korea’s latest missile tests, the United States, along with allies like Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the European Union, have imposed additional unilateral sanctions on North Korea and persistently demanded an end to the tests. Yet, these measures have not deterred North Korea from continuing its missile launches.
Resolve as a Strategic Weapon: The Asymmetry Advantage
If economic and diplomatic pressure has proven insufficient, what about military options? Research suggests a counterintuitive dynamic: it’s not despite US nuclear superiority, but because of it, that the United States struggles to deter a much weaker adversary like North Korea. The vast disparity in nuclear capabilities creates an asymmetry that can be a significant obstacle to denuclearization. Studies of past nuclear crises indicate that a substantial nuclear advantage can paradoxically alter crisis dynamics in unfavorable ways.
Crises between nations with vastly unequal nuclear capabilities become inherently high-stakes for the weaker power. Consider the Korean War: the Soviet Union, despite possessing a significantly smaller nuclear arsenal than the US at the time, effectively used nuclear threats to dissuade the United States from escalating the conflict and jeopardizing vital Soviet interests in the region.
Asymmetric crises carry such high stakes due to a crucial selection effect. Logically, a weaker nation should concede to the demands of a vastly stronger adversary, unless those demands threaten its core survival. However, this dynamic shifts dramatically when adversaries are more evenly matched in nuclear capabilities.
In “symmetric” crises, where nuclear powers possess comparable arsenals, the principle of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) comes into play. Each side can inflict unacceptable damage on the other in an escalatory scenario, creating a condition of general deterrence. This mutual vulnerability largely explains the “cold” nature of the Cold War.
However, in asymmetric crises, the weaker nuclear power finds itself in a precarious position. Resisting the stronger adversary’s demands risks escalation to war. Yet, conceding to demands that are perceived as existential threats is often unthinkable. The weaker nation’s primary recourse becomes demonstrating unwavering resolve to fight, aiming for immediate deterrence and a temporary reprieve from pressure. In essence, the weaker nation persists because it feels it has little left to lose, adopting a “maximum or bust” approach.
Research validates this strategy. When a nation possesses a nuclear arsenal more than 50 times larger than its adversary, its chances of prevailing in a crisis approach zero. Even with an arsenal just three times larger, victory becomes less frequent than defeat. Advanced research using methods tailored for small datasets indicates that exceeding an adversary’s nuclear arsenal by more than half its size offers no statistically significant advantage in crisis situations.
The Commitment Problem: A Core Conflict
These dynamics are clearly at play in the US-North Korea relationship. At the heart of this protracted crisis lies a commitment problem, rooted in fundamental disagreements over the future of North Korea’s nuclear program and the authoritarian regime that champions it. The United States has consistently stated its desire to eliminate both. US leaders have repeatedly declared that a nuclear-armed North Korea is unacceptable.
President Biden’s 2022 National Defense Strategy explicitly states, “there is no scenario in which the Kim regime could employ nuclear weapons and survive.” Former CIA Director Mike Pompeo revealed that President Trump directed the agency to “separate the North Korean regime from its missiles and nuclear weapons.” President Obama, in a 2015 interview, characterized the Kim regime as “brutal and … oppressive,” suggesting its eventual collapse was inevitable and something the US was actively seeking to “accelerate.”
While the US could theoretically offer a deal – nuclear disarmament in exchange for regime security – the underlying commitment problem remains. Over time, the US would face an inherent incentive to renege on such a promise. Having neutralized North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, the US could be tempted to pursue regime change in Pyongyang, mirroring its actions in Libya after its disarmament agreement. As Professor James Fearon aptly argues, the fundamental issue is North Korea’s justifiable distrust of US long-term intentions. This deep-seated mistrust prevents North Korea from committing to denuclearization.
Consequently, crises between the US and North Korea become existential for the North Korean regime. Kim Jong-un must project unwavering resolve in the face of any perceived threats to his nuclear program. For North Korea, backing down is viewed as an existential risk, even if escalating the risk of nuclear conflict also carries catastrophic potential consequences. In these high-stakes scenarios, North Korea’s resolve becomes a risky but potent strategic asset.
Despite possessing overwhelming strategic advantages in conventional and nuclear forces, the potential consequences of North Korean nuclear escalation are simply too catastrophic for the United States to contemplate. This reality lends credibility to North Korea’s signals of resolve, often achieving immediate deterrence despite its limited nuclear capabilities. This dynamic places the United States at a distinct disadvantage. It’s a stark reminder that in this particular context, being “bigger” in terms of military might doesn’t automatically translate to strategic superiority.
US policymakers should carefully reconsider any strategies that emphasize further expansion of US nuclear capabilities in dealing with North Korea. Such approaches are unlikely to be effective against a weaker adversary whose primary advantage lies in its unwavering resolve. If Pyongyang’s resolve is indeed its key strength, the US must focus on undermining and counterbalancing it – not through arms build-up, but through demonstrating unwavering cohesion and determination in its alliances. The recent trilateral coordination efforts between the US, South Korea, and Japan represent a positive step, but sustained and deepened synchronization of these alliances will be crucial to solidify trilateral ties and present a united front.
The United States cannot simply demand North Korea cease its provocations. However, it can manage each provocation with careful consideration, responding with coordinated and resolute messaging that clearly signals that North Korea is not the only actor with vital interests at stake.
